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Introduction 
Cyberspace has become politically important. Underpinned by Web 
2.0 technologies, the Internet is not only a means for communication but 
also the platform for gaining people’s support, which will be a more stra-
tegically important resource for world politics, with countless online fora, 
interest groups and social networks in which people can freely discuss and 
make consensus on certain political issues. Cyberspace is a new meaning-
ful political sphere for international politics. Its growing significance is 
closely related to the structural transformations of the public sphere. By 
collecting internet news from Reuters, AFP and Associated Press in De-
cember 2014 and utilizing Nye’s approach for analyzing soft power, this 
paper argues that the outcome of China’s cyber diplomacy is still limited 
by the over intervention of the official departments whose strategy is un-
dermining its credibility and validity. This research will be divided into 
four parts. The first part will discuss the political function of cyberspace 
with Juergen Habermas’ theory of the public sphere and the definition of 
cyber diplomacy. The second will examine the evolution and the composi-
tion of China’s cyber diplomacy. The third part will evaluate the outcome 
of China’s cyber diplomacy. The final part is the conclusion.
Cyber Diplomacy as a Meaningful Statecraft in the 
Postmodern Era 
Events and occasions as spheres that are open to all can be seen as 
public (Habermas 1991, pp. 1). The unrestrained communications in the 
public sphere would reach a consensus, and subsequently consensus in the 
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public sphere would become the source of political legitimacy. Café, sa-
lons and magazines in the 18th to 19th century in Europe were the typical 
examples of public sphere for politics. And the rise of these public spheres 
was propelled by the development of capitalism without the government’s 
intervention (pp. 57–79). But in the early 20th century, the public spheres 
for politics came to their end. Their political power was undermined by the 
rise of mass media and social intervention from governments. The public 
spheres lost their political criticalness, because people became the consum-
ers and followers under various marketing schemes and propagandas (pp. 
141–222). Habermas’ view towards the public sphere is rather passive. He 
believes that the political importance of the public sphere in the 19th cen-
tury no longer exists. Nonetheless, the world has changed a lot since the 
publication of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. The rise 
of neo-liberalism was followed by the fall of state capitalism. Affected by the 
changes of economic mode, the government’s control in society subsided 
and civil power rose. Consequently, the rift between governmental authori-
ty and civil society has become apparent (Gill 1995, p. 401). Therefore, the 
public sphere as the intermediary for this rift is being rejuvenated.
In the 21st century, as Web 2.0 technologies have been widespread, 
people are no longer passive receivers of information. Instead, they have 
become the creators of information due to the networked structure of cy-
berspace. As a result, the rising political capability of the public sphere is 
further reinforced by Web 2.0. Public opinion on the Internet becomes very 
critical on political issues. By setting up interest groups in the online fora, 
social networks and communication applications, people on the Internet 
are exerting great impact on the politics of the real world. For instance, 
the revolution in the Arab world has proved that a people’s movement on 
Facebook could even topple down a regime. And Edward Snowden’s whis-
tle-blowing is being supported by the Internet publics who have imposed 
great pressure on the US government’s spying scheme. Moreover, in his 
remark on social media, Gordon Brown pointed out: 
A  few years ago the debate was about whether the media controlled politicians or 
whether politicians controlled media. Now it is about how we are all responding to 
the explosive power of citizens, consumers and bloggers. The new focus on the envi-
ronment is the result of that. The Make Poverty History campaign was the result of 
that. Citizens are flexing their muscle (Ashley cited in 2007, para. 4).
As he indicated, the power relation between the government and civ-
il society is shifting. The individuals are endowed with more power in 
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21st century politics because of cyberspace (Nye 2010, p. 8). If Habermas 
could witness the Internet’s impact on politics when he was writing The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, the third structural trans-
formation of the public sphere might appear in the later chapter of his 
book. People in cyberspace are by no means the consumers of information 
now. In the age of Web 2.0, citizens can find their public spheres of the 
19th century in the cyberspace of the 21st century. They have become the 
important source of a  government’s legitimacy again and the strategic 
resource for world politics. As a result, cyber diplomacy as a meaningful 
statecraft comes into being.
Despite a  consensus on the definition of cyber diplomacy has not 
been made hitherto and there might be some variations among different 
concepts like cyber diplomacy and digital diplomacy, the public diplomacy 
in the cyberspace, as a means for liaison between the government and 
the foreign publics as well as the enhancement of the national interest, is 
recognized by the government and the scholars of international politics. 
According to the explanation given by the United States (US), “The De-
partment of State’s ‘cyber diplomacy’ encompasses a wide range of U.S. 
interests in cyberspace” (2011, para. 3). The US “will engage the interna-
tional community in frank and urgent dialogue, to build consensus around 
principles of responsible behavior in cyberspace and the actions necessary, 
both domestically and as an international community, to build a system 
of cyberspace stability” (The White House 2011, p.  11). Furthermore, 
from the interpretation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the 
British Government on its digital diplomacy, digital media are “now play-
ing a more important part in achieving key foreign policy outcomes”. And 
the policy teams are directly getting involved with the overseas publics 
in the digital platforms (2012, pp. 6–8). Moreover, defined by Jan Melis-
sen, cyber diplomacy is the evolution of diplomacy, “linking the impact 
of innovations in communications and information technology (CIT) to 
foreign policy and diplomacy” (2005, p. 30). With these explanations, the 
meaningful substances of this new diplomacy, no matter whether it is 
called “cyber diplomacy” or “digital diplomacy,” can be summarized with 
the following components: the direction by the government; the engage-
ment with the foreign publics; the pursuit of national interests; and the 
utilization of the digital devices. Therefore, “cyber diplomacy” is hereafter 
conceptualized by those four components for this paper, and the meaning-
less variations of the relevant concepts can be thus declined.
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The Development and Composition of China’s 
Cyber Diplomacy 
The Chinese government has been transforming the bureaucratic 
structure for the development of its diplomacy. In 1999, the Information 
Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up its Bureau of Internet Ad-
ministration to manage the websites of the ministry. It was the very begin-
ning of the Chinese government’s utilization of the Internet. In 2004, when 
public diplomacy as statecraft was recognized by the Chinese government, 
the Division of Public Diplomacy was established. By early 2010, the Divi-
sion of Public Diplomacy in the Information Department was upgraded as 
the Office of Public Diplomacy, undertaking more responsibilities in organ-
izing China’s cyber diplomacy. Its work included organizing the activities 
for public diplomacy, introducing the Chinese government’s foreign poli-
cies and attitudes towards the significant international issues to the media, 
managing the diplomatic fora, coordinating the operations of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs’ inner departments and oversea embassies and consu-
lates and constructing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ websites (Yang 2010, 
pp. 32–33). The function of the Bureau of Internet Administration was coor-
dinated into this office. By 2013, cyber diplomacy as a meaningful statecraft 
for the Chinese government was widely recognized (Zhao 2013, para. 4). 
China’s cyber diplomacy consists of three levels. The first level is 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ direct operation, which is the core of the 
whole. It involves two components. The first are the websites of the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs and its overseas embassies and consulates. It pro-
vides a huge amount of first-hand information about China for various 
cyber media of the world. According to the statistics from the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, in 2012 alone, the websites managed by the minis-
try have released over 190 thousand pieces of information. The themes 
include the activities organized by the ministry, the work of the govern-
ment officials and most significantly, the records of the ministry’s press 
conferences, which outline the government’s attitudes towards current 
events in the world. Due to the quantity and quality of the information, 
the main websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs received more than 
31 billion page views in 2013. The second component is the utilization 
of the social media. It provides direct communication for China’s cyber 
diplomacy. On Sina Weibo, the official account of the Office of Public Di-
plomacy, “外交小灵通” (little messenger of diplomacy), is followed by over 
6.6 million users. It has posted more than 11.5 thousand micro-blogs. 
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On Facebook, the Office of Public Diplomacy is also managing the pages 
for the government’s cyber diplomacy. Besides, many departments in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs have also created their official accounts on 
social networks, participating in China’s cyber diplomacy. Other than the 
activities for shaping China’s image in cyberspace, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs has an obligation in coordinating the activities from another two 
dimensions. As the core of the system, the ministry is not only the actor 
but also the director in China’s cyber diplomacy.
The second level of China’s cyber diplomacy are the operations of 
other official institutions. It is constructed by two administrative com-
ponents, which provide operational support for China’s national image 
despite their activities representing themselves. The first are the activities 
of other governmental departments. For instance, the Ministry of Educa-
tion and the China National Tourism Administration are communicating 
with the people via their official accounts. Additionally, some governmen-
tal organizations like the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs and 
Foreign Policy Advisory Committee are also conducting their cyber di-
plomacy by promoting their activities on their websites. Before carrying 
out its important activities, these organizations will have to obtain the 
approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by submitting their agen-
da and the guests involved (Wang 2009, p. 16). The second component, 
which exerts greater influence in this dimension, are the activities of the 
official cyber media, among which the most active ones are ChinaDaily.
com, CCTV, Xinhua News and People.cn. For instance, ChinaDaily.com, 
one of the enforcers of China’s public diplomacy, in its official accounts 
on Twitter, provides various Chinese news information, culture, and for-
eign policies for the world public. Moreover, ChinaDaily’s activities in 
the real world reinforce its communication in cyberspace. Among those 
the most important is the annual Beijing-Tokyo forum, which was set up 
by ChinaDaily and Genron NPO jointly. Since 2005, by investigating the 
public opinion in China and Japan and promoting genuine dialogues be-
tween China and Japan’s elites, this forum has been the most significant 
platform for China’s public diplomacy. Its achievements are exhibited on 
its website regularly. What is more, the activities conducted by one official 
cyber medium would be strongly supported by other Chinese cyber media. 
For instance, the Beijing-Tokyo Forum is also supported by the influential 
media, like Tencent News. Likewise, opinion released by Xinhua Net will 
also be reposted by other cyber media in China. Cooperation among differ-
ent Chinese cyber media is strong due to the government’s coordination.
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The final level is the participation of the Chinese civil society, which 
mainly provides advisory support for cyber diplomacy. It consists of two 
parts. The first is the Chinese netizens’ opinion. International politics as 
a topic is frequently discussed on China’s online fora such as Tianya.cn 
and People.cn because of the online nationalism (Wang 2006, pp. 1–13). 
In fact, the BBS of people.cn was initiated by China’s denunciation of 
the US’s bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999. If the 
Chinese government misconducted in an international conflict, a flood of 
criticism would emerge on the online fora. Opinion on these fora could be 
a huge factor for the process of the decision of Chinese diplomacy. So the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has deployed special officials to convey public 
opinion from these online fora. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs has been conducting direct interviews with people online, absorbing 
their opinion into its diplomacy. The most influential one is “外交大家谈” 
(let’s talk about diplomacy), which is a theme activity organized by the Of-
fice of Public Diplomacy regularly. It is a platform for the direct commu-
nication between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chinese netizens. 
From 2012–2013, it had been held over 11 times (The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of P.R. China 2013). 
Graph 1. The Three-Level Structure of China’s Cyber Diplomacy
Source: Author’s own data
The directors from different departments of the ministry listen and 
answer the questions from Chinese netizens via this interview. This ac-
tivity is broadcast live on several Chinese cyber media simultaneously 
and Chinese netizens can participate in it via these media. To this ex-
tent the government creates a tie between Chinese officials and people in 
cyberspace. The second part are the elite groups from the Chinese civil 
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society. Non-governmental think tanks are making contributions to cy-
ber diplomacy intellectually. For instance, the Charhar Institute, an in-
dividual think-tank specializing in diplomatic studies, discusses China’s 
diplomatic affairs on the Internet and provides consultative support for 
China’s cyber diplomacy frequently. Han Fangming, the founder of this 
think-tank, has been elected as the representative of Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC) and the vice director of the 
Committee of Foreign Affairs in CPPCC.
The outcome of China’s cyber diplomacy 
China’s cyber diplomacy might have gained some achievements. As the 
BBC’s annual survey on national image indicated, from 2007 to 2013, the 
respondents who had positive views towards China had increased by 5%. 
This slight rise might originate from the promotion of Chinese culture and 
the positive image of Chinese youth in cyberspace. According to the report 
of the Charhar Institute in 2013, the non-Chinese respondents are very pos-
itive about Chinese youth, who are widely recognized as hardworking, ener-
getic and seen as the hope of China. Furthermore, also in this report, 61% of 
the non-Chinese respondents expressed their interests in learning Chinese 
culture, and a  third of them would like to learn Mandarin (2013, p. 10). 
Therefore, the promotion of Chinese culture and the communication among 
the Chinese and the foreign youths on the Internet might be meaningful.
Nonetheless, the outcome of China’s cyber diplomacy is still limited. 
The negative side of China’s national image could not be shrugged off at 
least in short term. The BBC’s annual survey in 2007 found that 42% of 
the 28,000 respondents from 27 countries had negative views towards 
China. In 2013, the figure was almost the same. Among those 26,299 
interviewees from 25 countries, 42% of them still held negative views 
towards China. Criticism against China has never ceased throughout the 
evolution of Chinese diplomacy. The lack of the credibility and validity 
are the constraining factors in China’s cyber diplomacy.  
The lack of credibility mainly derives from the over intervention of 
the government. Indeed cyber diplomacy, as a branch of public diplomacy, 
requires the direction of the government. But in its implementation, the 
civil society should take the major part. The government is a poor speaker 
and often suspected of conducting propaganda. Conversely, the non-gov-
ernmental agents have more credibility and detailed expertise in society; 
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they are regarded as the more appropriate actors in conducting public diplo-
macy (Riordan 2004, p. 14). Nonetheless, the first and the second levels of 
China’s cyber diplomacy are tightly controlled by the official departments. 
And the most influential Chinese cyber media, for instance, ChinaDaily.
com and Xinhua.net, are considered as the tongues of their government. 
The Chinese civil society, which should be considered the proper actor in 
cyber diplomacy, can merely provide advisory support for the system. In the 
real world, the entry barrier for establishing a NGO is still high in China. 
According to the Administrative Regulation of Register for the Mass Organ-
izations, the applications for the register have to gain the consent from the 
administration department, and the qualified organization should have at 
least 50 individual members or 30 members from its administrative depart-
ment. Further, the minimum registered capital for the nationwide organiza-
tion is 50,000 RMB, and that for the local ones is 10,000 RMB. Moreover, 
the registered organizations must have their fixed operation place (2014, 
para. 20–25). Under these requirements, many online interest groups might 
not be qualified for application. Furthermore, currently the Chinese govern-
ment is inclined to purchase the social services from the government-or-
ganized NGO (GONGO). Few independent NGOs are able to receive the 
offers unless they have good relationships with the Chinese government. In 
cyber diplomacy, the Chinese government also tends to trust those think 
tanks that are under official supervision (e.g. the Charhar Institute) and 
listens to the people’s opinion from the fora set up by official media (e.g. 
the BBS of People.cn). Opinion from individual fora and interest groups 
has not been fully coordinated into the system of China’s cyber diplomacy. 
The age of information is marked by the rise of the individual actors, which 
have greater power in conducting cyber diplomacy. The lack of independent 
NGOs’ participation and over dependence on the official departments in 
the system could ruin the credibility of China’s cyber diplomacy.
Secondly, the conceptual gaps between China and the developed 
countries would also undermine the credibility of China’s cyber diploma-
cy. In the interpretation of the concepts of human rights and democracy, 
China’s steady stance on its uncommon values might be disliked by other 
countries. For instance, the Western world believes that human rights 
originate from natural law and social contract theory; people’s possession 
of human rights has no link with the social reality. On China’s side, the 
concept of human rights derives from traditional culture like Confucian-
ism and Marxist thoughts, and the Chinese government reckons that the 
development of human rights should be closely related to the social real-
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ities (Zhang 2012, pp. 83–97). In the aspect of democracy, the Chinese 
government keeps insisting its own means to democracy. It believes that 
its political system reflects the social conditions currently and it has per-
formed well. Likewise, its idea has nothing common with the democratic 
ideologies of the Western countries, which emphasize the universality of 
democracy (Weil & Jing 2012, pp. 113–127). This divergent perception 
has created an undemocratic image for China among the Western publics, 
despite Chinese leaders mentioning the development of Chinese democ-
racy on various occasions.
As for the lack of credibility, China’s cyber diplomacy also suffers the 
problem of validity. In some issues, China’s cyber diplomacy has not yet 
remedied its negative image. The Chinese government needs to justify 
them more in cyberspace. Otherwise, China’s cyber diplomacy would fail to 
shoot the right targets. The most vulnerable issues for China are as follows.
Diplomatic disputes. As the power of China rises, some Asian coun-
tries are seeking support from the USA. Especially in the disputes of the 
Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands) and Huangyan Island (the Scarborough 
Shoal), China’s effort in safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity has frightened its neighboring countries. In other world political 
issues (e.g. the crisis in Syria), China’s peaceful solution is not compatible 
with the Western countries. Therefore, the endeavors for shaping China as 
a contributor to world peace are rarely perceived. The poll of Global Times 
revealed that only 13% of the 14,400 respondents from 15 countries would 
like to describe China as peaceful. However, 29.4% of them reckon that 
China is a “belligerent” country (AFP 2013, para. 2–7). Furthermore, cy-
ber security is also an embarrassing issue for China’s diplomacy, because 
China is the top suspect in cyber-attacks. Many officials of governments 
and institutes assert that hackers under the Chinese government’s con-
trol have compromised their cyber networks and stolen confidential infor-
mation. In the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s 
(USCC) 2012 annual report to Congress, China again was described as 
a country that had been pursuing other countries’ defense information for 
its political and security objectives. Despite the fact that Chinese officials 
have been denying those accusations and expressed their willingness of 
safeguarding world cyber security, their rebuttals have gained little effect, 
because tracing the commander in a botnet is tough and the hackers tend 
to capture the computers from China to launch their attacks due to China’s 
poor credibility in this issue (Lieberthal & Singer 2012, pp. 11–13). The 
rage towards China’s “rascality” will by no means calm down in short term.
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Domestic affairs. The credibility of a  state’s diplomacy is closely 
related to its domestic affairs. Some issues could have huge damage on 
China’s image. The first are the political scandals, which have got much 
attention from the world publics. In the age of information, the intensify-
ing flows of information on the Internet make politics more transparent. 
According to the statistics released by the Charhar Institute in 2013, only 
10% of people in developed countries held positive views towards Chinese 
politics; 30% of them thought that the Chinese government was severely 
corrupted. Secondly, Western countries’ understanding of China’s human 
rights also hampers the effect of its cyber diplomacy. According to the Chi-
nese government’s white paper, Progress in China’s Human Rights, the 
Chinese government in recent years had been promoting human rights 
in various dimensions and admitted that there was room for improve-
ment. However, the room is much more impressive than the promotion 
for the developed countries. As the US government’s human rights report 
of 2013 mentioned, the Chinese government’s respect to its people’s free-
doms was far from satisfactory (U.S. Department of State 2014, p. 1). The 
events of violating human rights are still widely reported by foreign media. 
The progress of China’s human rights advocated by the official media is 
rarely perceived by the world public. Moreover, other domestic issues like 
pollution, crime and social unjustness also undermine China’s image in 
cyberspace when they are reported by the world cyber media. 
Economic disputes. The world has witnessed the rapid growth of 
the Chinese economy in recent years. However, in this field, China’s 
diplomacy is still hobbled by two problems. The first one is the quality 
of Chinese goods. The unsophisticated management of market regula-
tion and the lack of the protection of intellectual property hurt the fame 
of Chinese commodities. Over 50% of the world public in the Char-
har Institute’s investigation indicate that the Chinese commodities are 
known for low quality, poor after-sales service and fake goods (2013, 
p. 16). The second problem are the trade disputes. Export is one of the 
most important driving forces for the growth of China’s GDP. So with 
various approaches the Chinese government endeavors to accelerate the 
growth of its export volume. But some countries consider the subsidies 
on the export product as conducting dumping. For instance, in 2013, 
China’s expanding export of solar panels was investigated by the Euro-
pean Commission. As the EU imposed anti-dumping measures on Chi-
nese solar panels, the conflict was triggered. As a result, the pages of the 
cyber media of the EU were flooded with negative reports and comments 
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against China, hurting its national image in cyberspace. Furthermore, 
China is also regarded as a currency manipulator by some countries. On 
various occasions, the officials of the developed countries stated that 
the Chinese yuan was undervalued, even though the value of yuan had 
increased. This image as a currency manipulator also provokes criticism 
against China in cyberspace. 
Indeed in many issues, China’s national image in the eyes of the world 
public is negative. However, the extent to which those issues undermine 
China’s images in cyberspace may vary. In order to find the vulnerable 
issues for China in cyberspace, the following part will conduct a quanti-
tative analysis on the news items from the notable news sources on the 
Internet.
To conduct this analysis effectively, each piece of negative report 
against China from Reuters, AFP and Associate Press during December 1 
to 31, 2013, was regarded as a single unit of the population, and the titles 
of these news items shall include the keyword of China. In order to ensure 
the items were credible, the range of the collection was targeted on the 
first 10 pages of each search result from Google News USA by inputting 
Reuters China, AFP China and Associate Press China respectively, day-by-
day, during that period. Then all eligible negative news items were picked 
up from that range after examining the contents. After the collection, 
a population of 631 items was set up. During the sampling period, Chi-
na had declared its new Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), which 
triggered tension in the Pan-Pacific area, especially in Japan. Furthermore, 
other domestic scandals of corruption and human rights events were still 
widely reported by the cyber media. Furthermore, controversy over the 
EU’s imposition of anti-dumping measures on Chinese solar panels also 
happened in this month. The variety of these issues in this period could 
guarantee the validity of the sampling. Then the population was divided 
into three categories. They were economic disputes, domestic affairs and 
diplomatic disputes. The proportion of these three categories in the popu-
lation is illustrated in Chart 1.
As shown in Chart 1, with 297 items in the population, diplomatic 
disputes took up the largest percentage of the whole. And the category of 
domestic affairs also shared a large part in the chart; its proportion was 
40%. However, the economic issue was the smallest in proportion; it only 
had 81 pieces in the population. And the distribution of those three cat-
egories of news in the three selected cyber news agents is illustrated in 
Graph 2.
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Chart 1. The Proportion of Diplomatic Disputes, Domestic Affairs 
and Economic Disputes in the Population
Source: Author’s own data
 
Graph 2. The Distribution of the Three Categories in Reuters,  
AFP and Associate Press
Source: Author’s own data
As Graph 2 indicated, those three cyber news sources shared a similar 
overall amount of news items in the population. The Associate Press (AP) 
had paid more attention to China’s diplomatic disputes but was indifferent 
to China’s economic disputes. While Reuters news online was most inter-
ested in reporting the economic disputes of China among the three sources. 
Nonetheless, its number of news for economic disputes was still relatively 
lower than the other two categories. Likewise, AFP also attached great im-
portance to China’s diplomatic disputes and domestic affairs and paid less 
attention to China’s economic disputes. In sum, those three news sources 
had shown similar preference in reporting China’s negative news.
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As the statistics above reveal, China’s diplomatic disputes and do-
mestic affairs were the two main wounds for its image in cyberspace. In 
order to find out the deadly issue for China’s cyber diplomacy more exact-
ly, the categories of diplomatic disputes and domestic affairs were subdi-
vided into several individual problems.
The issues included in the category of diplomatic disputes were mil-
itary threat, Dalai Lama’s visit, spying activities, unfair treatment to the 
USA’s journalists, rebuttal against Chinese media, cultural conflict with 
Korea and others (issues with less than 3 items). The proportion of these 
issues in the subsamples of diplomatic disputes is shown in Chart 3. 
 
Chart 3. The Proportion of the Issues in the Category of Diplomatic Disputes
Source: Author’s own data
 As Chart 3 revealed, the news concerning China’s military threat 
(mainly triggered by China’s announcement on its Air Defense Identifi-
cation Zone) took up the majority. There were 227 items of that sort in 
these subsamples. Other issues just had a small proportion in the chart. 
Together they took up less than a quarter of the whole. So the negatives 
news of China’s military threat was thus dominant in these subsamples.
Likewise, the category of domestic affairs also contained various topics 
of China’s negative news. As well they could be sorted out with seven is-
sues, which were human rights, domestic crimes, social health problems, 
political scandals, outdated ideologies, industrial accidents and others. After 
the sorting, the distribution of these issues was summarized in Chart 4.
As shown in Chart 4, the distribution was more even than that of dip-
lomatic disputes. Three major issues took up the majority of this category. 
They were human rights (70), social health problems (62) and domestic 
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crimes (40). But other issues like political scandals (14), industrial acci-
dents (16) and outdated ideologies (24) still had their parts, which could 
not be ignored in this category. None of these issues could be as dominant 
as military threat in diplomatic disputes. 
 
Chart 4. The Proportion of the Issues in the Category of Domestic Affairs
Source: Author’s own data
The overwhelming amount of the negative reports on China’s mil-
itary threat on the Internet was hatched by the following facts. China’s 
announcement of ADIZ in the East China Sea was widely concerned and 
caused a  chain reaction against itself. Soon after China’s declaration, 
South Korea also extended its ADIZ, which partially overlaps with Chi-
na’s. Then Japan urged support from the USA to counter against China. 
Consequently, flows of worry were aroused and reports on China’s mili-
tary threat to the world flooded the Internet. For instance, a Reuters report 
on December 5, 2013, had been forwarded to other cyber media 3,633 
times. In another category, there is no such issue that could be as influ-
ential as China’s military threat. For instance, in the category of domestic 
affairs, the most attention-catching news item was a Reuters report on 
China’s smog on December 9, 2014, which got forwarded just 503 times.
On the other hand, China’s cyber diplomacy was still obsessed in pro-
moting Chinese culture and history and failed to explain China’s ADIZ 
to the world public more explicitly. For example, ChinaDaily’s main page 
on Facebook was still introducing Chinese martial art, wooden temples 
and space program, not providing any justification on China’s ADIZ dur-
ing that period. Neither the Confucius Institute Online nor the CCTV’s 
accounts on Twitter had explained China’s diplomatic actions when the 
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cyber media were criticizing China at that time. Therefore, China’s cyber 
diplomacy was not always targeting the right place when a crisis of nation-
al image emerged. Additionally, the Chinese government’s diplomacy in 
the geopolitical domain was inconsistent with its diplomatic pursuits in 
the virtual world. In other words, the validity of China’s cyber diplomacy 
was far from satisfactory to this extent. This circumstance echoed with 
Joseph Nye’s comment on China’s soft power. As he put it, “a Confucius 
Institute in Manila to teach Chinese culture might help produce soft pow-
er, but it is less likely to do so in a context where China has just bullied 
the Philippines over possession of Scarborough Reef” (Nye 2013, para. 4). 
Likewise, when China is having military disputes with its neighboring 
countries (no matter who is right or wrong), panics over China’s military 
threat would dominate the headlines of the cyber news and subsequently 
linger in people’s dialogues in cyberspace. China’s effort in cyber diploma-
cy is very likely ruined consequently. Therefore, the geopolitical conflicts 
with the neighboring countries to this extent can be regarded as the deadly 
wound for China’s image in cyberspace. 
Conclusion 
China has recognized the political importance of cyberspace. It has 
constructed its cyber diplomatic system with a three-dimension structure. 
Due to the lack of credibility and validity in its system, currently China’s 
effort in cyber diplomacy has gained little outcome. As various polls indi-
cated, still a great number of people in the world dislike China. To a large 
extent, the hatred is caused by China’s military actions against its neigh-
boring countries. The promotion of Chinese history and culture cannot 
eliminate the world’s concerns regarding China’s military threat. The 
Chinese government has to attach more importance to the justification 
of its foreign policy in cyberspace. Moreover, the improvement of China’s 
cyber diplomacy is also related to the development and participation of its 
civil society, the bridging of the conceptual gaps with the world, the better 
governance in domestic affairs. 
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